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In Forsham v. Harris the United States Supreme Court held that records
generated and possessed by a private organization receiving federal study
grants are not agency records subject to the disclosure requirements of the
Freedom of Information Act unless they are in the possession of an agency
subject to the Act. The holding affirms the property/control theory used
by lower courts in determining which records are subject to FOIA obliga-
tions. Moreover, the decision indicates that control is synonymous with a
present possessory interest in the records in question. Balancing the inter-
est in preserving grantee autonomy against the interest in promoting maxi-
mum disclosure under the FOIA, the Court concluded that extending the
FOIA to the work product of private grant recipients was not within the
contemplation of Congress at the time the FOIA was enacted.
Michele Healy Ubelaker
Application of the Texas Venue Statute to Strict Liability in
Tort: Lubbock Manufacturing Company v. Sames
Jesus Verduzco was driving a tractor-trailer filled with liquified petro-
leum gas when it overturned and exploded in Maverick County, Texas,
causing his death. The trailer had been manufactured and sold by Lub-
bock Manufacturing Company, a Texas corporation with its principal
place of business in Lubbock County, Texas. The administrator of
Verduzco's estate filed a suit for wrongful death in Maverick County, al-
leging strict liability in tort for the defective design of the trailer. Lubbock
Manufacturing filed a plea of privilege,' arguing that it had a right to be
1. TEX. R. Civ. P. 86 provides:
A plea of privilege to be sued in the county of one's residence shall...
state that the party claiming such privilege was not, at the institution of such
suit, nor at the time of the service of process therein, nor at the time of filing
such plea, a resident of the county in which suit was instituted, and shall state
the county of his residence, and ... that "no exception to exclusive venue in
the county of one's residence provided by law exists in said cause."
When a plea of privilege is filed in accordance with this rule, it shall be
prima facie proof of the defendant's right to change of venue ....
Under Texas law, the plea of privilege is the only method for a defendant to challenge
venue. Texas Highway Dep't v. Jarrell, 418 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. 1967). The filing of the plea
of privilege places the burden on the plaintiff to controvert the plea by establishing one of
the exceptions to TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1980), the
Texas venue statute. General Motors Corp. v. Courtesy Pontiac, Inc., 538 S.W.2d 3, 6 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ); Citizens Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Gilley, 521 S.W.2d 354,
356 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ); Fleetwood Constr. Co. v. Western Steel Co., 510
S.W.2d 161, 163 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ).
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sued in Lubbock County,2 the county of its domicile.3 The trial court
overruled the plea of privilege, holding that venue was proper in Maverick
County because a part of the cause of action, Verduzco's death, had arisen
there. 4 The court of civil appeals affirmed,5 but on writ of error the
Supreme Court of Texas reversed, 6 holding that venue was not proper in
Maverick County because a part of a cause of action for venue purposes
does not arise in the county in which only the physical injury occurs. The
Texas Supreme Court then granted a motion for rehearing. Held, theprior
opinion of the Court is withdrawn; judgments of the courts below are af-
firmed: In an action for strict liability in tort, venue is proper in the county
in which the physical injury occurs. Lubbock Manufacturing Co. v. Sames,
598 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. 1980).
I. DAMAGES AS A PART OF A CAUSE OF ACTION
Under the Texas venue statute, article 1995, 7 no person can be sued out
of the county in which he is domiciled, unless the plaintiff establishes that
his case falls within one of the enumerated exceptions. Subdivision 23 of
the statute contains the exceptions to the general venue rule applicable in
suits against private corporations.8 One part of subdivision 23 provides
that, in a suit against a private corporation, venue may be maintained in
the county in which the cause of action or a part thereof arose. 9 Under this
exception, the courts generally have held that damages alone are not a part
2. The basic right to be sued in the county of domicile is set out in TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1980).
3. For venue purposes, domicile means residence. See Mijares v. Paez, 534 S.W.2d
435 (Tex. 1976).
4. Lubbock Mfg. Co. v. Sames, 575 S.W.2d 588, 589-90 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1978).
5. Id. at 592.
6. Lubbock Mfg. Co. v. Sames (Lubbock Manufacturing I), 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 28 (Oct.
17, 1979).
7. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 1995 (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1980).
8. Subdivision 23 provides:
Suits against a private corporation, association, or joint stock company may be
brought in the county in which its principal office is situated; or in the county in
which the cause of action or part thereof arose, or in the county in which the
plaintiff resided at the time the cause of action or part thereof arose, provided
such corporation, association or company has an agency or representative in
such county; or, if the corporation, association, or joint stock company had no
agency or representative in the county in which the plaintiff resided at the time
the cause of action or part thereof arose, then suit may be brought in the
county nearest that in which plaintiff resided at said time in which the corpo-
ration, association or joint stock company then had an agency or representa-
tive.
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(23) (Vernon 1964) (emphasis added).
9. The Texas Legislature purposely chose the term "arose." Prior to 1879 the Texas
venue statute had provided that an action could be maintained in the county in which the
cause of action or a part thereof "accrued." In Phillio v. Blythe, 12 Tex. 124 (1854), how-
ever, the Texas Supreme Court objected to the inherent subtleties in the term "accrued," and
the Texas Legislature subsequently adopted the term "arose" with relation to suits against
Texas corporations. 1874 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 87, § 1, at 109, 8 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF
TEXAS 107 (1874).
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of the cause of action sufficient to support venue under subdivision 23.10
The fact that damages were sustained in a particular county, without more,
has not been sufficient to establish venue in that county.
The question of whether damages constitute a part of a cause of action
under subdivision 23 was first considered by the Texas Supreme Court in
Stone Fort National Bank v. Forbess." In Stone Fort the plaintiff had de-
posited $300 with the defendant bank located in Nacogdoches County,
Texas. Thereafter, the plaintiff drew a draft in favor of a second bank
located in Randall County, Texas. The Randall County bank then
presented the draft for payment at the defendant Nacogdoches County
bank, but the defendant failed to honor it. The plaintiff sued for damages
in Randall County, alleging that the defendant's refusal to honor the draft
had injured his credit in Randall County and had precluded him from
entering certain profitable business ventures in that county.' 2 On writ of
error, the Texas Supreme Court held that venue was improper in Randall
County. ' 3 The court reasoned that a cause of action within the meaning of
subdivision 23 consisted of two elements: the primary right arising out of a
transaction and the violation of that right. 14 Because both the transaction
creating the right, plaintiff's depositing funds in appellant's bank, and the
transaction violating that right, appellant's refusal to pay the draft, oc-
curred in Nacogdoches County, no part of the cause of action arose in
Randall County.' 5 Thus, the court found that the county in which the
right was created or violated would be proper for venue purposes, but that
the county in which the damages alone had occurred would not be
proper. 16
10. See Stone Fort Nat'l Bank v. Forbess, 126 Tex. 568, 91 S.W.2d 674 (1936); Pesek v.
Murrel's Welding Works, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ
dism'd); Burrows v. Texas Kenworth Co., 554 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ
dism'd); Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Haden Co., 543 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1976), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 553 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. 1977); American Quarter
Horse Ass'n v. Rose, 525 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ); Ben
Griffin Tractor Co. v. Garza, 497 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, no writ).
But see Teague Brick Sales Co. v. Dewey, 355 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1962,
no writ) (allowing venue to be maintained against a brick manufacturer in the county in
which the bricks were installed). See also Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. v. Kilstrom, 456
S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970, no writ) (duty found to be breached in McLennan
County because defendant had delivered product and failed to warn of danger or take steps
to prevent explosion in that county); National Life Co. v. Wolverton, 163 S.W.2d 655 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1942, no writ) (some part of the right or transaction must have arisen in
county in which suit is brought).
II. 126 Tex. 568, 91 S.W.2d 674 (1936).
12. The suit was based on the breach of contractual duties arising out of the bank's
relationship with the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed that the bank had a duty to honor his
draft under the terms of their agreement and that the bank was liable in damages for failure
to do so. Id. at 570, 91 S.W.2d at 675. Additionally, exemplary damages were sought on the
ground that the defendant's actions were wilful and malicious and, as a result, had substan-
tially injured plaintiff's business reputation. Id.





Similarly, in Ben Griffin Tractor Co. v. Garza17 the court of appeals lim-
ited venue to the county in which either the plaintiffs right or defendant's
duty arose or the violation or breach occurred and disregarded for venue
purposes the fact that the damages had occurred in another county. In Ben
Griffn suit was brought in Tarrant County to recover damages for injuries
sustained in that county when the plaintiffs automobile collided with a
wheel that had sheared off a trailer being pulled by the defendant. The
defendant subsequently filed a third party complaint seeking indemnity, or
alternatively, contribution from the seller of the trailer who was domiciled
in Dallas County. The court of civil appeals held that the trial court erred
in overruling the seller's plea of privilege, reasoning that no duty had been
breached in Tarrant County, the county in which the accident had oc-
curred.1 8 The court stated that damages were not a part of a cause of ac-
tion for venue purposes 19 and transferred the suit to Dallas County, the
seller's county of domicile.
In Teague Brick Sales Co. v. Dewey,20 however, the Amarillo court of
civil appeals departed from the decisions that had followed Stone Fort by
holding that the plaintiff had established a cause of action sufficient to
support venue in the county in which he had been damaged, even though
the defendant was not domiciled in that county. The plaintiff had sued for
breach of implied warranty, claiming that the masonry products manufac-
tured by the defendant and used in the plaintiffs home were defective.
The home was located in Armstrong County, but the defendant's county of
residence was Freestone County. Using a plea of privilege, the defendant
asserted its right to be sued in Freestone County, arguing that the fact that
the damages had occurred in Armstrong County did not support venue in
that county. The court overruled the plea of privilege, reasoning that the
plaintiffs cause of action, or a part thereof, had arisen in Armstrong
County because the plaintiff "was not damaged until and unless the brick
began to crumble and chip after being placed in the walls around the
house."'2 ' Apparently recognizing that the plaintiff had no cause of action
until he was damaged, the court found venue to be proper in the county of
injury.22
The Supreme Court of Texas rejected Teague Brick in Haden Co. v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp.23 and reaffirmed its holding in Stone Fort that
damages are not a part of a cause of action for venue purposes, 24 and
therefore, are not sufficient to support venue in the county in which only
the damages occur. In Haden the plaintiff sued Johns-Manville Sales Cor-
poration in Wichita County, alleging breach of an implied warranty of
17. 497 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, no writ).
18. Id. at 71-72.
19. Id. at 71.
20. 355 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1962, no writ).
21. Id. at 250.
22. Id.
23. 553 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. 1977).
24. Id.
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fitness on asbestos panels sold by the defendant. The panels were
purchased and delivered in Dallas County, but proved defective when
later installed in Wichita County. The defendant, an Illinois corporation,
filed a plea of privilege pursuant to subdivision 27 of article 1995,25 assert-
ing its right to be sued in Dallas County. The plea of privilege was over-
ruled by the trial court, but the court of civil appeals reversed. 26 The
Texas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, rejecting the reasoning of
Teague Brick.27 Thus, until Lubbock Manufacturing II, damages were not
a part of a cause of action for venue purposes. Rather, to establish venue
in Texas a duty had to arise in the county in which the action was brought,
or at the very least, the duty had to be breached in that county.28
II. STRICT LIABILITY AND TEXAS VENUE
Since 1942 the Texas courts have recognized that the seller of a defective
product may be held strictly liable in tort for damages caused by that prod-
uct.29 The courts initially imposed strict liability only upon sellers of prod-
ucts made for human consumption, 30 but in McKisson v. Sales Affiliates,
Inc. ,31 the Supreme Court of Texas, adopting the Restatement (Second) of
Torts section 402A, 32 determined that the sellers of any defective product
25. Subdivision 27 prescribes venue in suits against non-Texas corporations. "Foreign
corporations, private or public, joint stock companies or associations, not incorporated by
the laws of this State, and doing business within this State, may be sued in any county where
the cause of action or apart thereof accrued .... "TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(27)
(Vernon 1964) (emphasis added). While the statutes pertaining to foreign corporations and
domestic corporations differ slightly, the courts must still resolve the issue of whether dam-
ages are a part of a cause of action and therefore sufficient to maintain venue under either of
them.
26. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Haden Co., 543 S.W.2d 415, 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1976), writ ref'dn.r.e. per curiam, 553 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. 1977).
27. 553 S.W.2d at 760.
28. In addition to the breach of duty requirement, the courts recognized a bias in favor
of the defendant, deciding borderline cases against the plaintiff and thus effectively restrict-
ing the scope of the venue exceptions. See Permian Basin Life Ins. Co. v. Stuart, 357 S.W.2d
615 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1962, writ dism'd). See also Burrows v. Texas Kenworth Co.,
554 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ dism'd).
29. See Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942) (al-
lowing recovery for illness caused by contaminated sausage in action for breach of implied
warranty). See also Sweeney v. Cain, 243 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1951,
no writ) (recovery for injuries caused by contaminated soft drink); Bowman Biscuit Co. v.
Hines, 240 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1951) (recovery for injuries caused by
cookie containing piece of metal wire), af'd, 151 Tex. 370, 251 S.W.2d 153 (1952). For a
discussion of the development of the theory of strict liability in tort, see generally Emroch,
Statutory Elimination of Privity Requirement in Products Liability Cases, 48 VA. L. REV. 982
(1962); Keeton, Rights of Disappointed Purchasers, 32 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1953); Winship,
Commercial Transactions, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 203 (1979).
30. The appellate courts repeatedly evidenced their reluctance to extend strict liability
to other defective products until the Texas Supreme Court did so. See, e.g., Sales Affiliates,
Inc. v. McKisson, 408 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1966), rev'd, 416 S.W.2d 787
(Tex. 1967); Capetillo v. Crosby County Fuel Ass'n, 407 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1966, no writ).
31. 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
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that caused physical harm could be strictly liable in tort.33 Under section
402A of the Restatement (Second), anyone who sells a defective product
that causes physical harm to a consumer or to his property is strictly liable
if that person is in the business of selling such products and if that product
reaches the consumer without substantial change in the condition in which
it was sold.34 Thus, after McKisson, a Texas consumer had to show actual
physical injury to recover in a cause of action for strict liability.
Despite McKisson, the plaintiff in Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shiv-
ers35 contended that a mere economic loss was sufficient to bring an action
for strict liability.36 The Supreme Court of Texas rejected the contention,
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
33. 416 S.W.2d at 789. Considering a claim for injuries received from the application of
a beauty product, the court reasoned that no valid distinction existed between products that
caused injury through ingestion and those that are dangerous when contacted externally.
The plaintiff had suffered scalp bums and loss of hair after using a permanent wave prepara-
tion sold by a representative of the defendant beauty supply company. The court, after
adopting the language of Restatement § 402A, held that the plaintiff had made a case for
strict liability in tort. Id. at 792-93. In so holding, the court recognized that the jury had
found that the preparation was not reasonably fit for the use of giving permanent waves and
that the plaintiff's attempted use of the product was the proximate cause of her injuries. Id.
For a discussion of the early development of strict liability in tort, see Freedman, Defect in
the Product: The Necessary Basis for Product Liability in Tort and in Warranty, 33 TENN. L.
REV. 323 (1966); Noel, Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24
TENN. L. REV. 963 (1957); Prosser, The Attack Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960);
Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L.
REV. 363 (1965); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
34. Today, a cause of action in Texas for strict liability in tort is governed by the Re-
statement (Second) subject, however, to a balancing of factors as recognized in Turner v.
General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979). In Turner the Texas Supreme Court
held that the risk of harm factor could be set against the utility of the product's design in
determining whether to hold the manufacturer strictly liable in tort. Id. at 849. For a dis-
cussion of current interpretations of strict liability in tort, see Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 1 (1980).
35. 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977). In Nobility the purchaser of a mobile home brought an
action under § 402A to recover damages for economic loss. Although the trial court, sitting
without a jury, had found that the home was defective in both workmanship and materials,
no evidence showed that the defects made the home unreasonably dangerous or caused
physical harm to the plaintiff or to his property. As a result, the court held that the plaintiff
could not recover under a strict liability in tort theory. Id. at 78. For a discussion of theories
of recovery in products liability law, see Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw.
L.J. 1 (1978).
36. For a discussion of whether economic loss is sufficient to bring an action for strict
liability, see Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 1(1971); Speidel, Prod-
ucts Liability, Economic Loss and the UCC, 40 TENN. L. REV. 309 (1973); Comment, Implied
Warranties and "Economic Loss," 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 370 (1972); Comment, The Vexing
Problem of the Purely Economic Loss in Products Liability. An Injury in Search of a Remedy,
4 SETON HALL L. REV. 145 (1972); Comment, Manufacturer's Liability to Remote Purchasers
for "'Economic Loss" Damages-Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 539 (1966); Note,
Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 917 (1966).
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holding that pecuniary loss alone would not support an action for strict
liability. 37 Instead, the court restated the established view that "'[t]here is
a distinction between physical harm, or damage, to property and commer-
cial loss' "38 and found that physical harm to the ultimate user or con-
sumer or to his property was a prerequisite to a section 402A recovery. 39
McKisson and Nobility Homes firmly established the principle that ac-
tual physical harm is a prerequisite to recovery for strict liability in tort,
but neither case addressed the question of venue. When faced with the
venue issue, the Texas courts continued to make no distinction between
application of subdivision 23 to suits involving strict liability claims and
other types of actions.40 In Pesek v. Murrel's Welding Works, Inc.41 a de-
cedent's estate brought an action for strict liability against the manufac-
turer of an oil truck that had been designed and built in Hockley County.
Suit was filed in Frio County, the county in which the accident had oc-
curred. After the defendant filed a plea of privilege, the trial court trans-
ferred the case to Hockley County. The court of civil appeals affirmed the
transfer, holding that the explosion and resulting deaths in Frio County
did not support venue in that county under subdivision 23.42 Thus, the
court affirmed the rule that damages are not a part of a cause of action
sufficient to support venue under subdivision 23.
37. 557 S.W.2d at 80.
38. Id. (quoting Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Morrison, 455 S.W.2d 825, 826 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st. Dist.] 1970, no writ)).
39. The court's reasoning follows the stated preference of the courts of appeals, see
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. v. Talley, 493 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, no
writ); Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Morrison, 455 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1970, no writ), as well as the California approach to the problem, see Seely v. White
Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965); Hiigel v. General Motors
Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1975) (following Seey).
In Seely Justice Traynor explained the justification for allowing products liability recov-
ery when physical injury has occurred and for not allowing such recovery when the loss is
merely pecuniary:
The distinction rests. . . on an understanding of the nature of the responsibil-
ity a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products. He can appro-
priately be held liable for physical injuries caused by defects by requiring his
goods to match a standard of safety defined in terms of conditions that create
unreasonable risks of harm. He cannot be held for the level of performance of
his products in the consumer's business unless he agrees that the product was
designed to meet the consumer's demands.
63 Cal. 2d at 15, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23. Traynor's reasoning reflects a tradi-
tional reluctance to extend the scope of a defendant's duty for omissions that amount to
mere nonfeasance. For a general discussion of the traditional view, see W. PROSSER, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS ch. 9, § 56, at 339 (4th ed. 1971). A minority of jurisdictions,
however, have extended the doctrine of strict liability to actions involving economic loss.
See Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970);
Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Kassab v. Central
Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc.,
58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973).
40. Compare Pesek v. Murrel's Welding Works, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1977, writ dism'd) and Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Haden Co., 543 S.W.2d
415 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976), writ refd n.r.e. per curiam, 553 S.W.2d 759 (Tex.
1977) with Stone Fort Nat'l Bank v. Forbess, 126 Tex. 568, 91 S.W.2d 674 (1936).
41. 558 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ dism'd).
42. Id. at 44.
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III. LUBBOCK MANUFACTURING CO. V. SAMES
In the original opinion in Lubbock Manufacturing Co. v. Sames (Lub-
bock Manufacturing 1)43 the Texas Supreme Court, in a five-to-four deci-
sion, found persuasive the authority and reasoning of Pesek and Stone
Fort.4 Justice Barrow, writing for the court, recognized "no valid reason
for making a distinction [in the] settled rule [between] cases brought to
recover damages under a theory of strict liability in tort because of the
defective design of a product" and other types of actions.45 Because all
acts of manufacturing and design of the product in dispute had taken place
in Lubbock County, the court held that the fact that the injury occurred in
Maverick County, where suit was filed, was insufficient to maintain venue
in that county under subdivision 23.46
After the initial decision, the court granted the plaintifis petition for
rehearing.4 7  On rehearing, the court identified the primary issue as
whether the single fact that the injury had occurred in the county of suit
was sufficient to maintain venue in that county under article 1995, subdivi-
sion 23.48 Setting aside its earlier opinion, the court concluded that in an
action for strict liability in tort venue is proper in the county in which the
injury occurs.49 The court emphasized that no cause of action for strict
liability exists unless actual physical harm to person or property occurs. 50
Therefore, the court found "no room for questioning the certain fact that a
part of a cause of action for strict liability in tort arises when and where"
the injury occurs.5' In so holding, the court did not overrule the cases that
previously had held that damages are not a part of a cause of action.5 2
Rather, the court distinguished the earlier cases, stating that all of the prior
decisions had involved the breach of a contractual obligation.5 3 The court
43. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 28 (Oct. 17, 1979).
44. fd. at 29. The court cited Pesek and Stone Fort as authority for the rule that dam-
ages are not considered sufficient to support venue. In addition the court cited Burrows v.
Texas Kenworth Co., 554 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ dism'd); American
Quarter Horse Ass'n v. Rose, 525 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ).
23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 30.
45. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 30.
46. Id.
47. 598 S.W.2d at 238 (Lubbock Manufacturing II). Justice Campbell, writing for the
majority, adopted his dissent in Lubbock Manufacturing I. All eight justices participating in
the rehearing agreed with the holding. In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Barrow
would have extended the holding to actions within the meaning of art. 1995(27). Id.
48. Id. at 235.
49. Id. at 237.
50. Id. at 236.
51. Id. (emphasis in original).
52. See id. at 237. See also note 10 supra.
53. According to the court "[ajll of these decisions involved a breach of a contractual
obligation," 598 S.W.2d at 237, but immediately preceding that statement was a citation to
Pesek. The court apparently failed to recognize that Pesek involved a factual situation al-
most identical to Lubbock Manufacturing. In distinguishing Pesek the court merely noted
that the plaintiff had failed to prove a cause of action and, therefore, that the plea of privi-
lege was properly granted. In Pesek the San Antonio appellate court expressly rejected the
notion that the case involved a contractual breach when it stated: "[Tihe defendant did not
contract to do anything, or participate in any transaction in [the county in which damages
occurred]." 558 S.W.2d at 44.
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noted that proof of the creation and breach of a contractual right com-
pletely establishes a violation of a legal right for which a plaintiff is enti-
tled to at least nominal damages, regardless of whether actual damages are
shown.54 In contrast, a plaintiff has no cause of action based on strict lia-
bility in tort unless actual physical harm to his person or property results. 5
Therefore, the court concluded that a part of a cause of action sufficient to
support venue arises in the county in which that harm occurs.56
The court's decision in Lubbock Manufacturing HI does away with the
inconsistency in holding a physical injury essential to recovery for strict
liability in tort but insufficient to support venue. The opinion does, how-
ever, raise serious practical considerations. Since the court addressed only
those actions brought under section 402A of the Restatement (Second), a
plaintiff who alleges negligent design and breach of implied warranty, but
fails to plead strict liability in tort, will presumably not be able to bring his
cause of action in the county where damages occur. Thus, the practical
effect of the decision could be to encourage plaintiffs to plead strict liability
in tort, primarily as a defense to an anticipated plea of privilege. Argua-
bly, all actions in the products liability area should be afforded the same
venue alternatives.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the second of two opinions in Lubbock Manufacturing Co. v. Sames
the Texas Supreme Court held that in an action for strict liability in tort
venue is proper in the county in which the injury occurs. The court distin-
guished prior decisions that had held that injury alone was insufficient to
maintain venue in the county in which the injury had occurred because
those decisions had involved a breach of a contractual right entitling the
plaintiff to at least nominal damages when creation and breach of that
right occurred, regardless of whether actual injury resulted. In contrast,
54. The court recognized that the cases adhering to the Stone Fort rule and relied upon
by Lubbock Manufacturing involved causes of action in which none of the necessary ele-
ments had occurred in the county of suit. Accordingly, in those cases, the court concluded
that the plaintiff had
alleged a cause of action that was complete and mature, entitling him to nomi-
nal damages in vindication of a right, regardless of whether he later was able
to prove actual damages. In such instance, it is obvious that whether he suf-
fered any actual damages or the extent thereof would not constitute a part of
his cause of action in the venue sense.
598 S.W.2d at 236.
55. Id. at 237.
56. Id. By carefully distinguishing the earlier cases, the court let stand the established
rule that a duty must be created or breached in the county in which the action is brought.
According to Lubbock Manufacturing H1, the element of damages in an action for strict
liability in tort must be proven as a prerequisite to recovery. Since that requirement is
unique to actions for strict liability in tort, the direct effect of this decision in the basic
negligence area should be minimal.
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